

*DRAFT – comments most welcome*

**Private Contractors - Private Military Corporations**

**Danger across the Arc of Instability**

**2008 Patuxent Defense Forum**

**St. Mary's College of Maryland**

**April 9-10, 2008**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In the last two decades the phenomenon of military contractors and private military corporations (PMCs) has reached a kind of critical mass for discussion and concern about their functions and possible limitations. **First**, this paper argues that private contractors have had their benefits, but now they and the private military corporations (PMCs) are becoming of questionable value for extended “short war” engagements and PMCs are particularly detrimental for success in “long war”. **Second**, the contention is advanced that private military corporations foster a climate of unresponsive government in third/fourth world states and contribute to the crowding-out of the public space. As a consequence PMCs have contributed to the accelerating expansion of “ungovernable / abandoned space” and war-lord politics across the arc of instability – particularly in Africa. **Third**, a number of conclusions will offer some suggestions for the implementations of checks and balances to prevent further expansion of detrimental externalities and consequences, and channel the functions of PMC toward assisting in the creation of good governance and other aspects of sustainable public-private creativity as outlined in World Bank IMF initiatives, UN’s millennium development goals, and elsewhere.

## **1. Introduction**

The use of private contractor has existed for some time and depending on ones definition can go back several decades – Brown, Root, & Johnson was a bit contractor in Vietnam some forty years ago. A landscape change came with the end of the draft and the initialization of the all volunteer. In the civilian world the trend toward privatization was beginning to make headway with deregulation and the more toward privatization. This simmered for some time within the military; the initial moves toward privatization were being made in basic support services. The second change in the fundamental landscape occurred with the downsizing of the US military that was justified as part of the peace dividend of our Cold War victory and the demise of the Soviet Union. That downsizing led to further outsourcing and privatization.<sup>1</sup>

The beginning of the present phase of the rise of the private military industry can be traced back to the tenure of Dick Cheney as Secretary of Defense. In 1991 Cheney directed Brown and Root to conduct a study on the benefits of outsourcing military functions. This resulted in the birth of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which was a cost plus contract responsive to military logistical task orders.<sup>2</sup>

During the first Gulf War the ratio of contractors to soldiers was approximately one contractor to some fifty soldiers Early into the Iraq war (2004) estimates placed the number of active (armed) private soldiers as varying between fifteen and twenty thousand a ratio of 1 to 10. As the war grinded on contractors became ever more prevalent; and by the end of 2007 the estimates being bandied about were up to 160,000 – a ratio of 1 to 1 with our official uniformed military. Currently, private military corporations (PMCs) are an essential factor in Iraq.

Additional windows of opportunity also developed with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and obviously since the attacks of 9/11 that the private military corporation (PMC) industry has expanded in terms of sheer numbers as well as in terms of the types of services offered. PMCs have developed a portfolio of services which has broadened their client market in an atmosphere of social conditions that function along the lines of Says law, i.e. the supply begets its own demand.

Several studies of the PMC industry have resulted in a number of type constructs that attempt to help classify the industry along a number of lines. Thus far, those schemes that focus on functional differences have had the most mileage. Isenberg utilizes three categories of contractors: (1) personal security details for senior civilian officials, (2) non-military site security, and (3) convoy security.<sup>3</sup> Peter Singer’s construction also provides a threefold classification of (1) military support firms (logistics and services), military consultant firms (providing advice and training), and (3) military provider firms (providing implementation and command of conflict). This last category is the relatively new face of an old profession and is the area that has generated significant concern and a drive for oversight and regulation.

Another consequence of the end of the Cold War was the disengagement of the US, Russia, and the former colonial powers disengaged from Africa. In turn; the PMCs came to fulfill the growing need at the margins of national security in and along the arc of instability<sup>4</sup> For this researcher the phenomenon of PMCs in Africa is even more significant than Iraq in that PMCs have and are engaged in numerous arenas across the “arc of instability” or “non-integrating gap”, and most particularly, in Africa. The instability of these third and fourth world states, endangered states, and failed states is

common knowledge to anyone who reads the international news of any major paper. The term “non-integrating” is very important because it alerts the reader to the largest exogenous set of variables impacting this area. These are the enormous socio-economic changes that are impacting the world as a result of neo-liberal policies initially referred to as the “Washington Consensus” and now as “globalization”. Specifically, one specific form of direct foreign investment referred to as “enclave investment” has provided enormous wealth to the ruling elite of African states.

In consequence, these states have less need of interaction with the regional population and institutions of their own nations. Their power rests on exogenous sources of wealth and their survival is more practically served by utilizing the private military industry than their own national militaries. In this way the activity of PMCs here is more important than even in Iraq because their active operations in these areas abets and strengthens this phenomenon of governmental disengagement from large swaths of their own territory. Essentially, these firms are ensuring the survival of regimes with the security they provide and /or are engaged in conflict management. Whatever the case, they operate in a relatively unobtrusive manner – their activities are off the political radar of the west/north. Yet it is this feature of armed security/military operations that PMCs provide which raises the most significant challenges for the public space.

Finally, it must be pointed out this new global landscape and the profile of the private military industry on this landscape represents a form or engagement policy that can be categorized as “short war”. This is opposed to a focus at the polar opposite, i.e. “long-war”. It is the difference of these two focuses that is also a vector here, because the

PMCs operating in Afghanistan and Iraq and across the arc of instability are engaged / operating a short-war profile in a long war landscape or frame.

***Short war –Long war***

The phenomenon of short-war – long-war conceptualization and taxonomy can be more easily discussed with the use of a polar type construction that posits each as opposing concepts. While neither category is actually that discrete in the real world, the technique helps to isolate essential differing characteristics and facilitates the development of a more accurate and relevant continuum of vectors and forces. The term long war was conceived by James Carafano in a work that stressed that the dimension of time as a factor in the global war on terror was similar to the Cold War. Iraq and Korea are / was simply particular hot wars in a long time frame. This conception is reiterated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.<sup>5</sup> Short war is also a more bounded Clausewitzian framework that is echoed in the US by the authority / security approach of Huntington. Although Carafano and the QDR's focus is still on military response and uses the term in both a temporal and conceptual way, the more important point is that there is some recognition given to other than war factors such as politics, culture, and of course, the economy.

In my opinion this is these exogenous factors are the true distinguishing mark of long war; it is not simply about security. Security and military action are not independent variables. Rather, military structure, policy, and action are the dependent variables to these exogenous societal and institutional variables. This is all the more pertinent in this third era of globalization. The issue of the gap or arc of instability is its linkage to the core states of the global economy. Security follows development.

Again, these exogenous factors are the principal and principle point – that is, the most essential differentiation is that short-war, regardless of the length of time involved, is focused on micro and/ mid level variables which are also much more endogenous to the (whatever) present conditions of conflict. In contrast, a proper long war focus is conceptualized by its attention to *exogenous macro variables* such as the global

<b>Some Examples of Current Issues in the Short-War - Long-War continuum</b>		
Specific Criteria	Short War	Long War
The Rise of the four BRICs in general and China in particular  Enclave investment  The Demographics of Sub-Sahara Africa	Focus on two of the BRICs (Russia and China concerns their “strategic”, i.e. military positioning, military/space technological advances, etc. Little if any acknowledgement of the obvious – any military conflict with China severely and immediately threatens our national economy.	The focus on the two principal BRICs’s should be about interdependence, integration and partnership. It involves acknowledging what is already the case. The limits of military dominance should be obvious now if they were not so five years ago. We have to develop a development capacity that enables those nations in the gap to rise. Current policies and actions are contradictory to the millennium development goals and send the wrong signals – signals that can be distorted to encourage Africans to look east rather than west. <sup>3</sup>
The phenomenon and challenge of ungoverned space	Regional networking – construction of lily pad bases. Border protection and counter-terrorism training	QDR 06 penetrates into long war conceptualization with its discussion on a joint ground forces vision that acknowledges the importance of existent culture in area of operations <sup>2</sup>
Presence and Status of Security Forces	Major focus – policy of training and basing: African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program (ACOTA) <sup>1</sup>  When engaged as in Iraq the focus on clear, hold, and build	Security forces, particularly private security should be functioning with development NGOs. The goal is to touch the ground with programs that raise the standard of living for the ordinary African.  Focus should be on build, welcome, defend

(1) See Daniel Volman, “U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2006”, African Security Research Project; available at <http://www.allafrica.com/resources/view/00010822.pdf>.

(2) See Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p 54. – this mandate ...”they [troops] will understand foreign cultures” is an extremely tall order along the line of moving from “rifleman to diplomat in a matter of blocks” that is contained in Elements of Defense Transformation, available at <http://www.oft.osd.mil/index.cfm>, the Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation home page.

(3) See Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004. Ashwani Saith, “From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals Lost in Translation”, *Development and Change* Vol. 37, No. 6: 1167-1199, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006; Medea Benjamin and Andrea Freedman, *Bridging the Global Gap – A Handbook to Linking Citizens of the First and Third Worlds*, Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1989. Perhaps one of the most critical

economy; technological advances; the broadening of old markets; the creation of new markets; the rise of developing nations’ economies, population growth trends, environmental issues, cultural movements, and the like. Long war is more like the “art” as developed by Sun Tzu. In the US the social civic aspects of this are echoed in the Janowitzian model of civil military relations.

The focus on long war illustrates the agenda priorities of the administration and the cultural attitude of the U.S. in general Clash of ideas – our own cultural proclivity (or that of our commanding elites – to disavow or disregard the negative impacts of enclave investment and other such temporally profitable ventures and avoid and/or dismiss their negative externalities as long war perils.

***PMCs - Benefits and Drawback***

At the present time it appears that the drawbacks are overtaking the benefits. This is because of the short war security premise that has thus far always dominated the conceptualization of the PMC mission. The benefits would far outweigh real and potential deficiencies if the long war view that focused far more on peace keeping, and peace development through conflict reconciliation measures constructed with various appropriate NGOs The focus should be on the development of working public space.

***The Benefits***

The private military corporations have expanded their functionality to such a degree that it has been argued that they are now a legitimate member of our force projection. Some have argued that the formal forces of the United States cannot operate (certainly not for long) without them. P. W.

	Formal Armed Services	PMCs
1	Combat	Provider firms
2	Combat support	Consultant firms
3	Combat service support	Support firms

Singer is perhaps the currently most quoted author and analyst on this matter. His type construction of PMCs has mimicked the militaries nomenclature of force division (combat, combat support, combat service support); Singer employs the taxonomy of

military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms. Thus we have a parallel shadow of our official armed services. This view is also corroborated by a report from the National Defense university that describes the PMC industry as a three tier construction of consulting (training, planning, technical, linguistics, systems engineering), security (crisis management, intelligence gathering, physical security [facility protection] ), and logistics (fuel and material transport, base operations services, general maintenance support).<sup>6</sup>

A number of academic and independent researchers, industry spokespersons, and military authors have generated various inventories of the benefits of outsourcing and privatization. PMCs fulfill a host of non-core but essential functions with perhaps 80% of their activity being garnered by third tier (support) firms providing combat service support. Such support is so fundamental that policy has dictated the formation of “bridging” programs between the private supplier of support services and the military. LOGCAP and AFRICAP are two examples.<sup>7</sup> The overarching rationale for all of this civilian outsourcing and privatization rests of efficiency, functionality, and cost rationales. Essentially the benefits of PMCs can be bulleted as follows

- PMCs in general function as a force multiplier or supplement freeing up soldiers for essential combat tasks and filling in gaps as required
- PMCs can deploy more quickly than can UN or ad-hoc multinational forces; also it is assumed that they deploy with a coherent command and control structure
- Tier one (military provider) PMCs are engaged in many defensive military operations functions, particularly for nation states in the arc of instability
- Tier one servers can also engage in and provide assistance for counter narcotics functions
- Tier one PMCs can provide operations that fulfill covert policy aims that can be plausibly denied
- Tier two (combat support / consulting firms) PMCs have fulfilled essential training functions particularly for the militaries of weak states of Africa which are more than matched by intra state challengers Matthias Boysen

- Tier two (combat support / consultant firms) are essential factors in weapons systems maintenance and repair
- Tier three (combat service support / support) PMCs provide a legion of

### ***The Drawbacks***

Researchers accentuating the drawbacks of PMC basically focus on two broad areas: the consequences for the armed services and their governments and the political and legal implications of their use. Interestingly enough though proponents generally always mention cost savings, the available literature (whether that of proponents or opponents) is conspicuously barren in citation or discussion of any readily available cost based analysis. Avant cites a 1991 RAND study concerning the privatization of professional military education programs that found no cost savings and Center for Naval Analysis studies that supported savings only when competition was robust, but apparently did not include the externalities resulting from the disjuncture of reopening contracts for the bidding and review process.<sup>8</sup>

There are several drawbacks for the formal armed services which are mentioned by opponents of the PMC phenomenon. One consequence noted is that as a nation we are sinking financial resources into the private sector in a way that depreciates our national military capacity and expertise. A second, almost parallel argument is that salary differentials have created competition for elite forces. It is argued that this is thought to be the cause of an exodus of Special Forces from the military to the PMCs and commanders are now ostensibly seeking new pay and benefits formulations.<sup>9</sup>

The political drawbacks actually cover a rather wide scope. In international terms PMCs are seen as an arm of the corporate first world or first world / Western governments. This is particularly the case in Iraq. Thus when the PMC fails to perform professionally or worse, when their behavior results in international furor, the nation –

state / employer is severely compromised. Whether perception or reality, contractors were at the center of the international incident at Abu Ghraib and DynCorp employees were linked to organized prostitution in Bosnia and Blackwater and Triple Canopy employees to the shooting of civilians in Iraq.<sup>10</sup> Other concerns note a number of hypothetical possibilities and query about:

- the immediate and mid term consequence if PMC personnel refused to participate / enter particular areas as being too dangerous thereby compromising a plausible mission - commitment is based on a commercial contract
- the implications around a scenario where PMCs challenge legitimate governments

### ***The legal conundrum***

If prior incidents were of insufficient magnitude, the allegations of private entities being involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib, which were neatly sidestepped by the administration by way of the focus on and prosecution of lowly enlisted functionaries, then certainly the incidents involving Blackwater employees brought the issue to the systemic agenda of the legal profession. PMCs in Iraq have basically operated within their contractual brackets issued by the Department of Defense resulting in a condition where contractors are viewed as coalition allies, but exempt from the same rules (e.g. Geneva Conventions) which the formal military is subject to.<sup>11</sup> It has been noted across the literature that international and or national law bounding the activities of the military corporate organizations is vague, weak, insufficient, and relatively unenforceable.<sup>12</sup> Topics in the literature that engage the legal aspects of PMCs include but are not limited to

- Discussion of the UCMJ and Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
- Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols of 1977 and customary international law<sup>13</sup>

- Procedural rules and processes such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which was supplemented with Defense Department involvement (DFARS)
- Discussion of issues of accountability have noted that PMCs are international entities and as such they utilize the same principles of "off-shoring" to circumvent taxes and regulations that are available to other multi-national corporations<sup>14</sup>
- Issues of international and humanitarian law<sup>15</sup> including questions about
- The extent of state responsibility for PMC operations / behavior
- Reparations for violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL and International Human Rights Law (HRL)
- Issues concerning the legal status of civilian workers and "Status of Forces Agreements" (SOFAs) as well as The Hague (1907) and Geneva Conventions (1949) and their applications to US in Iraq<sup>16</sup>

At the domestic level, the conclusions of those on the continuum of those concerned to those opposed to the present extent and expansion of the PMC industry ask if the use and expansion of PMCs has gone too far and virtually all studies call for comprehensive regulation. The National Defense University study notes five reasons for regulation: challenge political-military control; rules regulating PMCs are unclear; lack of transparency; insufficient accountability; public interest stakes.<sup>17</sup> At the international level the concern is not simply governmental control, but rather an issue of good global governance. Global governance both acknowledges the state and limits of the United Nations as well as the rise of the market sector international entities that have been established in response to a functional need accelerated by the continued globalization of the state and society.<sup>18</sup> The public sector or space is shrinking in all areas of socio-political and economic life; including the security and defense sector – PMCs as a factor in the security market is accepted. The matter at hand is the degree of oversight and establishment of new "rule sets" appropriate to this change in the global condition.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Some Political Consequences***

When discussion enters into or encompasses the political realm, two issues become apparent. The first concerns the issue of transparency and the second the condition of congressional / institutional responsibility. The former involves procedural matters of contract awards, contract supervision, contract accountability, and the like. The latter is the more critical and involves a central issue – the condition of the public space. The use of PMCs has been accompanied by a plethora of demerit procedures and decisions to avoid political questions, hide casualties, hide costs, and most important, limit the amount and quality of public debate on a most vital national security issue – the mix of public-private contributions to and control over the national defense policy. It begs the question: are there any longer functions which are inherently governmental.

## **2. The Arc of Instability - Unresponsive Government and Diminished Public Space**

Studies on the PMC industry note that market growth will come from the area of the world where nation states are weak and or failing.<sup>20</sup> The geographical distribution of these states has been referred to as the arc of instability or the non-integrating gap. Perhaps the better of the two phrases is the latter because it includes consideration of the most macro of the exogenous variables impacting everything else, including the growth of the PMC industry. This arc or gap includes much of Central Asia and the Mid East, all of the African continent, much of Southeast Asia, as well as most of the Caribbean and Central America and significant areas of South America. The focus here is on Africa where the modern PMCs have been operating for over a decade and where market growth for their services their services is most likely to occur.<sup>21</sup>

The literature posits three principal reasons for the failure. The first, for which there is the most consensus argues that virtually all of the nations contained in the arc were Cold War pawns that were dropped from budgets in the post-Cold War world.<sup>22</sup> The second and more controversial reasons posited for failure (particularly in Africa) concerns the dictates of the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These “dictates” are captured in the phrase “the Washington Consensus” and denote the imposition of austerity budgets, deregulation, and privatization that were the conditions of international loans to nation states in Africa since the early 1980s. These conditions are blamed for the collapse of education, health, transportation, and communication infrastructures.<sup>23</sup> The third reason for the failure is the state of poor governance. The literature on Africa in this area goes far beyond the issue of corruption or rogue nations – virtually describing and labeling regimes as kleptocracies and criminal states.<sup>24</sup>

### ***PMCs in Africa***

The literature on PMC activity in Africa is certainly mixed to say the least with some viewing it as contributing to demerit goods if not being a demerit good.<sup>25</sup> Others view it as a merit good filling in where security gaps exist.<sup>26</sup> What is not at debate is the fact that there is a market demand and therefore there is a supply. The real issue is not whether there should be a role for PMCs, but rather the nature and extent of their role in Africa. The use of private contractors, outsourcing and creeping privatization has been with us since the volunteer military. It is has been the Bush / Cheney administration of the Iraq war which has made the PMC an integral part of the force structure – this is the era of the hybrid force<sup>27</sup>

The issue of PMCs and the diminution of the public space have revolved around issues of corruption, opportunism, and resource extraction. Among these, the most compelling argument revolves around the phenomenon of enclave investment and abandoned space. Essentially the argument is this: Enclave investment involves the establishment of a zone where transnational corporations from the energy or minerals extraction industry operate in a particular nation state and these zones are literally secured by fence, wire, and security forces. Royalties are paid to the state; little if any of these royalties benefit the population – there is little if any multiplier impact because the money does not flow through the broader economy, rather it remains local or leaves the country. Also and more importantly, the vast wealth the royalties provide the ruling regime allows that regime to hire private security forces to augment and/or supplant its own formal military. The regime is secured by the private sector and as such it requires ever less interaction with its own regional and local leaders and even less of the population for a political base. This has resulted in large sectors of abandoned space, ignored by an unresponsive bureaucracy – it is easier, even less risky to ignore and abandon than to engage and develop these areas. The survival of the regime does not require it to do so and it is the arrangements with private sector multinationals that provide the kind of wealth that they control that allow them to ignore calls for reform, good governance, and democracy by the West. PMCs and even NGOs are seen as enablers and beneficiaries in this process.

These abandoned sectors have become fiefs for local warlords who have come to engage in black market activity of merit goods (oil, diamonds, and other valued resources) and /or engage in the clandestine market of demerit goods (guns, drug

transshipment, and money laundering). The ultimate result has been an advantage for growth in criminal, guerrilla, and terrorist organizations. The establishment of the African Command is a direct consequence of the unfolding of these events as much as it is of any rise in Islamic fundamentalism that is independent of these events. Yet, it is the very process of globalization which has created this externality of difficulty which in turn requires management of the conflict and much of that management will be accorded to PMCs as part of the new hybrid force of AFRICOM. Conflict management then becomes a market sector for the PMC, while resolution of the conflict shrinks that market. Here is a potential conflict of interest. Yet this framing hides or masks the more fundamental cleavage that is contained in the short-war – long-war conceptualization of conflict mentioned above. Short war constantly manages conflict, long war seeks the resolution of conflict by way of economic, political, cultural negotiation and advance

### **3. Two futures**

The rise of the PMCs as a factor of production in our armed services force structure has been established for over three decades and has finally become recognized as such. The literature has traversed and will continue to traverse the ethical, legal, and accountability issues for some time to come. Yet with due respect to all of these arguments and the various directions they may take in the near future, there are essentially two possible futures. I have encompassed them in this paper under the rubric of short-war and long-war.

The short-war scenario is more predictable and familiar framework for analysis; it is in consonance with the military mind sets that dominate the Pentagon and the national

security establishment. This is reflected in the AFRICOM strategy of “lily pads bases” and regional training agreements that have been worked out with various nation states across Africa.<sup>28</sup> Again, as mentioned above the short-war view is Clausewitzian in its military conception and Huntington “esque” in terms of possessing a narrow focus. The tendency is to frame virtually all conflict as problems to address or even puzzles to be solved. War is viewed as primarily a military function with a more micro focus on symptoms (of terrorism, narco-trafficking, individual and light crew served weapons proliferation, etc.) and an immediate military response. It is behaviorally oriented in a framework where security is viewed as the foundation of progress.

Long War is framed more in Sun Tzu terms as a matter of political economics. It is Janowitz “ian” in its scope of focus and seeks to frame conflict in broader terms, as problems to be addressed or difficulties to be surmounted. War is viewed as primarily a political, economic and social engagement. Attention and policy is far more macro and focused on underlying political, economic, and social issues. These issues are addressed long before military action becomes necessary. Long war seeks to alter attitudes - development and socio-economic progress are viewed as the foundation of security. The long war scenario is much more complex and is not a frame that is readily applicable to the traditional military references

These two conceptualizations or type constructs of war are virtually polar types. It is obvious that given the developmental trends thus far that the US will follow the path of short war across Africa. Thus it would appear that the PMCs will also follow this as providers for a market developed by policy that focuses on security. But will it beget the results / effects that we want. My opinion is that it will not because the long term issues

of development, good governance, physical and human infrastructure will not follow. But it does not have to be this way. It is possible to blend these two approaches and develop a version of “smart-war” that enables us to not simply control immediate behavior at best, but also change attitudes in a way that begets both development and stability. What role then can the PMCs provide that addresses these socio-political difficulties? Note that smart war is not simply advanced technological weapons deployment, but rather a policy of socio-economic and political development and engagement that proceeds virtually in parallel with any military security program. If anything it should have the edge in planning and resources, because security cannot hold without it.

### ***Smart War in Africa***

Actually, PMC industry have begun to address the issue by designating a sector of the industry as the security sector reform and development (SSRD) and cites one company, Planning and Development Collaborative International – Architecture Engineering Consulting Operations and Maintenance (PADCO-AECOM), as connected / participating in Uganda and have USAID project / contracts in Tanzania, Burundi, Senegal, Egypt and elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> How close to the ground these projects can get and how responsive these project can help the respective governments to become will arguably become strong indicators as to how truly successful any integrative globalization “nation building” strategy becomes. In this frame, it is easy to place actual security / military functions as virtually tangential to success. If the United State is really going to pursue nation building, then the policy has to focus on a number of aspects; even the efforts of SSRD are limited. This author argues that our society really requires a full societal engagement.

***Involving the American Public***

One of the downsides of the conversion to an all volunteer military was never included in Gates study – a great deal of citizenship was thrown out with the bathwater when we ended the draft. That level of citizenship has never been replaced. I think this is apparent in the common dialog about our efforts in Iraq, i.e. that the United States military is at war in Iraq, while the American public is (at least until recently) at the Mall. Less than half of one percent of the American public has any stake in Iraq. I suggest that if we are going to seriously engage in nation building across the globe, we should start here in America first, to see it works before we export it. The country needs a form of universal civic service as outlines by Charles Moskos over almost two decades ago.<sup>30</sup> Whatever formulation it takes should have a military option – a kind of critical “nation-building” skills draft for the Guards and Reserves. Also a feature we should seriously consider is a form of blending that allows civic service in the NGO / PMC network in the sector of reform and development.<sup>31</sup>

In another paper, I noted and compared our efforts in Africa with China’s efforts there. China is engaged in a multi-faceted approach that has a strong possibility to surpass our endeavors. It appears that they are far more focused on development strategies than are we. They seek to establish long term relations; it appears that we seek immediate security results and profits for American interests. China’s strategy has the distinct possibility of turning Africa to the East. For example, over 750,000 Chinese small (family) businesses have relocated / migrated to China and the reception they have received is mixed.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, they are establishing firm contacts at the local and regional levels as much or more than, they are with current national structures and leaders - they are utilizing their population as a weapon in a “development war”. What is rather

amazing is that perhaps the most centralized and bureaucratic authoritative regime in the world is experimenting, flattening their approach with “leading small groups”, albeit outside its own state territory with a kind of “horizontal thinking” and policy.<sup>33</sup> Further, they are viewing their efforts with a long-term perspective of investment rather than a short term focus on immediate profits; this is particularly the case with their large transnational state enterprises, which because of their relations to the state can operate at a loss, and do so, for what the government views as long term advantage.<sup>34</sup>

It is highly doubtful that we can compete in the same fashion. However, we should be able to develop a response if we also begin to think broadly across the spectrum rather than vertically searching for enemies in the Cold War way.<sup>35</sup> Force transformation is not about piling sophisticated weaponry and creating scenarios to experiment with it. Moving from “rifleman to diplomat in a matter of blocks”<sup>36</sup> involves function and role changes that require different forms of thinking, organizational (non-military) behavior, and forms of civilian world expertise – positive alternatives to negative punishments. In my opinion the security sector reform and development (SSRD) approach is the optimal positioning of the NGO / PMC community. What is essential is that our response must touch the ground and improve life for the ordinary African in order to change attitudes and develop a commitment to real democracy. The private sector should not loath the public space, because it is taking on a new form in the global network society – and in fact can not be stopped.<sup>37</sup> Most importantly, for our response to be truly successful will take more than USAID projects and their contract NGO and PMC agencies; it must have the involvement of the American public, which only a new surge of citizenship, here in America, can truly create.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Col James C. Becker Jr., USMC, “Privatized Military Operations: Final Report, Spring 2007 Industry Study, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. In this National Defense University study “outsourcing” is defined as the condition where the government maintains capacity but utilizes private sector for execution of functions and “privatization” is utilized to refer to the condition where the government no longer maintains capacity function is completely privatized.

<sup>2</sup> Laura Peterson, “Kellogg, Brown & Root (Halliburton)”, *Windfalls of War*, *The Center for Public Integrity*, Investigative Journalism in the Public Interest, <http://www.publicintegrity.org/WOW/bio.aspx?act=pro&dd1c=31>

<sup>3</sup> See David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”, Basic Research Report 2004.2, *British American Security Information Council*, September 2004. available at: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.htm>

<sup>4</sup> Deborah D. Avant, “Privatizing Military Training”, *Foreign Policy In Focus*, interhemispheric Resource Center and Institute for Policy Studies, Vol. 5, No. 17, June 2000.

<sup>5</sup> James Jay Carafano, Paul Rosenzweig, and Rebekah Robblee, *Winning the Long War: A Study Guide for Understanding the Public Policy Challenges of the War on Terrorism*, Washington DC: Heritage Books 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Becker, Op Cit.

<sup>7</sup> See Derek Wright and Jennifer C Brooke, “Filling the void: Contractors as peacemakers in Africa”, *African Security Review*, Volume 16, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 105 – 110. LOGCAP, United States’ Logistics Civil Augmentation Program; AFRICAP is its parallel that is currently engaged by the African Union.

<sup>8</sup> Avant, Op Cit.

<sup>9</sup> David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”, Basic Research Report 2004.2, *British American Security Information Council*, September 2004. Available at: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Becker, Op Cit., p 09.

<sup>11</sup> See Morton Hansen, “Iraq: An Uncertain Future For the Private Military Division”, 13 April, 2005, IDSS Commentaries (16/2005), *Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies*; [www.idss.edu.sg](http://www.idss.edu.sg)

<sup>12</sup> P. W. Singer, “Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency”, Policy Paper Number 4, *The Brookings Institution*, September 2007; <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx?p=1>

<sup>13</sup> Lindsey Cameron, “International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military Companies”, Basel, Switzerland: *Basel Institute on Governance*, Conference: Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide – February 8-9, 2007. pp. 1-13.

<sup>14</sup> See “Mercenaries Unbound”, *Global Guerrillas*, April 9, 2004, available at [http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/04/international\\_1.html](http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/04/international_1.html).

<sup>15</sup> UN, “Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, General Assembly, *United Nations*, 13, September, 2006, 61st session, Item 65 of the provisional agenda, A/61/341; see also “Expert Meeting On Private Military Contractors: Status And State Responsibility For Their Actions”, Organized by The University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Convened at International Conference Centre, Geneva 29-30 August 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, *Combat Studies Institute Press*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: *Combat Studies Institute Press*, UC263.K5 2005

<sup>17</sup> Becker, Op Cit. p 11.

<sup>18</sup> Manuel Castells, “The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy”, *The Network Society*, Washington DC: John Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006, pp. 3-21.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004. Barnett utilized “the non-integrating gap” to characterize the arc of instability. It has a significant advantage in that

it implies the conflict over the process, and consequences of globalization in all its forms, not only in terms of the dependent variable – security.

<sup>20</sup> See Roy Pateman, “The Eritrean War”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.17, No 1, 1990, pp. 81 – 98. For a discussion of the deterioration in West Africa see Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004, Part II, Empirical Findings”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp 234-253. McGowan indicates that from independence to 2004 across the sixteen states of West Africa there have been multiple coups, failed coups, and attempted coups totaling 169 events. He argues that it is the peripherality that begets the failure as opposed to the failure that begets its peripheral position. In the same issue see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Taming the Monster – Demilitarization and Democratization in Nigeria”, pp 254 – 272, which discusses the devolution of the Nigerian military. For a discussion of coup styles see Yekutiel Gershoni, “The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996, pp. 235 – 248.

<sup>21</sup> Virtually all the current literature on Africa notes the phenomenon of failing and failed states. The World Bank lists some 30 nation states as low-income or enduring poverty conditions and the CIA designates 20 nations as failing. The Fund for Peace constructed a failed states index of 60 nations ranked along a dozen indicators (known as the conflict assessment system tool – CAST). The index (failed states scoring a CAST total of 90 or greater) indicates that as of 2006, 53.6% (15 of 28) nations states in the failed state category are in Africa and 21.4% (6 of 28) are in the Mid East or Central Asia, with the remaining 25% (7 of 28) spread across South, Southeast, and East Asia, with one in South America.

[http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323)

<sup>22</sup> See Letitia Lawson, “U.S. Africa Policy Since the Cold War”, *Strategic Insights*, Volume VI, Issue 1 (January 2007). She posits that the high tide of idealism and its rapid ebb to a more “realist” posture and considerations occurred during the Somalia intervention in the 1990s, noting that the withdrawal was not just from Somalia, but from the idealist position.

<sup>23</sup> See James Ferguson, *Global Shadows – Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006; see also Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, *The Global Trap: Globalization and the assault on prosperity and democracy*, London: Zed Books, 1997.

<sup>24</sup> William Reno, “The real (war) economy of Angola”, *Angola’s War Economy*, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (editors), Pretoria: South Africa Institute for Security Studies, 2000, pp. 219-235. See also William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998 and Jean-Francois Bayart, *Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi (eds) *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*, London, Pluto Press, 1999. UN, “Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, General Assembly, United Nations, 13, September, 2006, 61st session, Item 65 of the provisional agenda, A/61/341.

<sup>26</sup> Eugene B. Smith, “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications, *Parameters*, Winter 2002-03, pp 104-119.

<sup>27</sup> Becker, Op Cit. This is acknowledged throughout the National Defense University Study and is explicitly phrased as such in that document.

<sup>28</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “New US Strategy: ‘lily pad’ bases - US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan”, *Christian Science Monitor*, August 10, 2004 - <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0810/p06s02-wosc.htm>. See also Daniel Volman, “U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2006”, African Security Research Project; available at <http://www.allafrica.com/resources/view/00010822.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Derek Wright and Jennifer C Brooke, Op. Cit. PADCO is one of USAID’s principal contractors in these areas and has extensive experience managing multifaceted USAID contracts involving multiple subcontractors. See <http://www.aecom.com/index.jsp>. PADCO and TSG combined to form AECOM International Development. This company went public in 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Charles C. Moskos Jr., *A Call To Civic Service – National Service for Country and Community*, New York: The Free Press, 1989.

<sup>31</sup> Here and there several excellent examples can be found. For one such example see “Beacon of Hope Rises From Field of Terror – Boston women help build Rwandan girls school”, *Boston Sunday Globe*, March 30, 2008, pp A1, A15,

<sup>32</sup> Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, “Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa”, *NYT*, August 18, 2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/world/africa/18malawi?ei=5124&en=1df62fle6>

<sup>33</sup> See Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (African Arguments Series), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. See page 29. These are subcommittees of the Communist party leadership.

<sup>34</sup> See Princeton N. Lyman, “China’s Rising Role in Africa” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2005; available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/>.

<sup>35</sup> Thomas P. M. Barnett, Op. Cit.

<sup>36</sup> See <http://www.oft.osd.mil/> for the brief statement of former Secretary Rumsfeld.

<sup>37</sup> In fact this is what China is experiencing in its effort to control internal discussion. See Edward Cody, “China: Activists charged with internet subversion”, (The Washington Post) *The Concord Monitor*, March 19, 2008, p. A4. Perhaps the most macro of sociological discussion of this matter is found in Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, (3 vols.) Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000. The lay person version of these macro level changes of “creative destruction” that demand new responses, is Thomas L. Friedman’s *The World Is Flat*, New York: Farrar, Stratus and Giroux, 2006.