

# Why is Africa Important

## Conditions and Circumstances

### More a matter of soft power / Conflict resolution

- Africa competition for resources
- Economic cooperation/Trade
- Growing importance in trade negotiations WTO
- Critical humanitarian issues
- Natural disasters
- Concerns for global health
- Large numbers of displaced people
- Demographic youth bulge

### More a matter of hard power/ Conflict management

- Africa as nuclear-weapons free
- Combating illegal Arms traffic
- Piracy
- Counter terrorism

## **States as International / Continental Actors**

Horn of Africa, an area half the size of the United States it includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, - broader definitions would include Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda

### **Why Somalia is a “litmus test”**

1. It is a failed state in near anarchy; as a consequence it is potentially dangerous for its immediate neighbors and the global community
2. It is the source location of piracy, the recipient location of drug and weapons trafficking
3. It is of significant interest to the global terrorist network as a potential base for African operations, although they have been unsuccessful (despite claims of various regional actors)

## Goals and Agendas

**The overarching goal must be peace and prosperity for the Horn – not the destruction of radical Islam**

A moderate Islamic regime is the best possible mechanism to resolve the clan conflict

There is currently a break in Al Shabab, one supports Sharif (Ethiopia is not center stage), the other is still against the TFG because they see African Union troops as another occupation and extension of Ethiopia

The more reactionary wing may be able to be contained because (

- 1) The big Islamic scholars in the country recently convened in Mogadishu and gave support to Sharif on the basis that he ends the presence of AU troops
- 2) He has agreed to institute application Islamic law,
- 3) Islamic Scholars have given Sharif four months and
- 4) he has requested the Parliament to approve application of Sharia law – the core is Qur'an, but application is in the Hadith (s)

# Goals and Agendas

## Soft Power / Conflict Resolution

- Support / encourage the TFG to participate / input in the Piracy and Khat issues
- Work for better dialog for/with Africom
- Assist in empowering a moderate Islamic regime

## Hard Power / Conflict Management

- Focus on piracy
- Focus on Arms reduction
- Focus on Khat trade
- Win over or neutralize War Lords

# **Consensus / Disparity in the Universe of Discourse**

## **For the United States**

### **ACCEPTABLE**

- **Stability**
- **Accountability**
- **Moderate or liberal government**
- **Free trade and good business climate**

### **UNACCEPTABLE**

- **Extreme Islamic system**
- **Hostile views and hostile public sentiment toward U.S.**

## **For Somalia**

### **ACCEPTABLE**

- **Stability**
- **Accountability**
- **Moderate or liberal government**
- **Free trade and good business climate**

### **UNACCEPTABLE**

- **Balkanization of Somalia**
- **Anti-Islamic policies**

## **Resources / Technical Conditions of Organization**

### **Soft Power / Conflict Resolution**

- **Somalia has /is losing what human capital it had – but that human capital (in the business and education communities still exists**
- **Clan allegiances are extremely problematic**
- **A great resource resides in the various Diaspora communities who currently provide over \$1 Billion in remittances**

### **Hard Power / Conflict Management**

**The strongest resources are in the Islamic leadership community and to a degree in the War Lord leadership**

**There is virtually nothing that could resemble a centralized command structure**

**Africom can engage and strengthen the TFG – with equipment and (training from a distance)**

## **Responsiveness of Institutions**

**The international donor system needs restructuring – it currently indirectly allows the nation state in the Horn to make demands impacting third parties**

### **Soft Power / Conflict Resolution**

**National and regional government institutions / ministries are virtual shells**

**The only (in Somali terms) institutional development has been in the educational sector – despite the daily conflict (the university of Mogadishu is actually thriving**

### **Hard Power / Conflict Management**

**Africom can develop input and participation from at the most basic planning levels and avoid backlash**

**Africom (or through the private sector) could provide training for the development of a national Somali force**

## Existing Opportunities for Action

### Soft Power / Conflict Resolution

- Enlist the Somali Diaspora Community to provide insights and access to the clan leadership structure
- Assist the Islamic community to help stop both the demand and supply side of the Khat equation
- Demand international pillage of Somali coastal waters be stopped
- Harness the Somali business community in South Africa, Kenya, Dubai, US and Canada to begin a dialogue to develop and implement solutions

### Hard Power / Conflict Management

- Identify and interdict in the Khat supply trade in Kenya and Eritreia
- Identify the money trail for piracy of international shipping
- But also offer to assist Somali in securing its shore line from illegal international dumping and fishing – this would resonate /constitute a huge point of leverage with not only Somalia but across Africa

# Strategy and Tactics

## Soft Power / Conflict Resolution

- Positive engagement may work; negative engagement or no engagement is a losing strategy
- Vigorously seek the input of the Diaspora community as actors to offer ideas and influence for peace in Somalia – their influence and actions NOT information to enable the US as actor – Somali's must be the actors
- Attack the international fishing issue
- Track the financial trails of piracy, Khat, and weapons trade

## Hard Power / Conflict Management

- A hard military response will not work in the long run
- Conflict management must be aligned with long term conflict resolution
- Use TFG and Islamic precepts – to attack demand culture for Khat use
- Interventions against pirates should remain at sea
- US military resources to identify traffic in neighboring nations
- Outreach to new government through intermediaries for assisting in the rebuilding of a national military/police force

## **Relationships and Networks**

### **Soft Power / Conflict Resolution**

- **Seek to encourage development of actual collaboration among various player groups (nation states local and international Ngos, Africom, UN, moderate Islamic organizations, secular business organizations, etc.)**

### **Hard Power / Conflict Management**

- **Seek to identify and disrupt illegitimate networks**

## **Scope and Range of Involvement**

### **Soft Power / Conflict Resolution**

- **Civilian agencies can engage over the next three years if the TFG can become viable and be strengthened**

### **Hard Power / Conflict Management**

- **Africom can develop close institutional involvement if it can keep physical distance – and engage as a partner providing assistance**

INTERFACE QUESTIONS AND THE NINE-FOLD TABLE

Standard Structural Difficulties	Situational Aspects Social Conditions	Orientation Aspects Relations/Mind Sets	Stratification / Position Agendas and Goals
Types of Expert Actors			
<p>Ideas / Knowledge</p> <p>The World of the Nat-ural/Social Scientists or Specific Issue Actors as Experts</p>	<p>1</p> <p>The Status of Public Opinion in Connection with the Issue</p> <p>Identify the various publics involved (attention and identification groups, attentive and mass publics).</p> <p>Measure of sensational quality or mundane nature of issue, i.e. how much attention or awareness does issue have in the public sphere.</p> <p>Questions concerning the stability, malleability, and direction of movement in public opinion.</p>	<p>2</p> <p>The Consensus and Disparity in the Universe of Discourse</p> <p>Questions to assess the orientation (consensus or conflict) of actor groups to interest action</p> <p>Knowledge of opponents values and broad view of social world</p> <p>Identification (and control - links to other blocks) of the symbolic dimension.</p>	<p>3</p> <p>Comparison and Ranking of the Systemic Agenda</p> <p>Questions about the public agenda, the agenda of various player groups in connection with the issue.</p> <p>Knowledge of opponents agenda ranking, strategies, and tactics.</p>
<p>Institutions</p> <p>The World of the Political / Administrative Decision-makers</p>	<p>4</p> <p>Assessment of the Technical Conditions of Organization</p> <p>Questions here should measure the various kinds of re-sources each action group has, i.e. ascertain the type and strength of leadership structure, weigh the strength of their organizational capabilities, and estimate the actual number of adherents they possess</p>	<p>5</p> <p>Measurements of the Responsiveness of Institutions</p> <p>Questions involving measures of the credibility the institution and actors have for each other in general and for the particular issue at hand are necessary as is an assessment of role orientations. Calculations concerning the agency (actors) posture - the degree of openness and the style of management are appropriate</p>	<p>6</p> <p>Scope and Range of Current Agency Involvement</p> <p>Assessments about the status of player groups are needed.</p> <p>Is the legitimacy of each accepted or challenged.</p> <p>Is there competition for legitimacy as issue organization or lead agency?</p>
<p>Action</p> <p>The World of the Issue / Interest Group Social Movement Organization</p>	<p>7</p> <p>Listing of the Existing Opportunities for Action</p> <p>Questions about general and specific time frames are necessary to ascertain the current status of possibilities.</p>	<p>8</p> <p>Quality and Quantity of Relationships with Others</p> <p>Questions here measure the extent, and formality of relationships and networks among various actors</p>	<p>9</p> <p>Assessment of the Strategy and Tactics Employed</p> <p>Questions and measures here should assess the kind, location, level, and arenas of action various groups have employed thus far.</p>

## Conclusion / Caveats

- Ideas motivate individuals and supra-individuals to take action to change or prevent change in institutional settings – all players face the same basic hurdles or socio-structural blocks and to prevail must “win” the majority of social space
- Somalia is important and a worthwhile effort for soft power strategies, because gains there will resonate across Africa – hard power strategies should be on the “soft side”
- The short term solutions should be a function of long term goals
- Somalia has to be addressed in the frame of a positive sum game; which is difficult since virtually all strategies employed have been more zero sum than not
- Nothing will unite Somali against the west as will occupation – the people want peace – with inclusive strategies the situation could turn in favor of the west within four to six years
- Avoiding engagement is a losing strategy