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- Puzzle: What is “victory?”
 - Everyone seeks it in military conflicts
 - Both sides
 - Simply: when you’ve beaten the other side.
 - But: doesn’t seem to be that simple
 - Bush’s (in)famous “Mission Accomplished” banner
 - We had won; there was no more organized military resistance to our troops. Yet, here we are, six years later. So: what is “victory?”

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- We started with Clausewitz:
 - Use of force is meant to accomplish political ends
- There is a hierarchy of issues :
 - Politics: setting goals and mobilizing resources
 - Strategy: plan to turn resources to achieving goals
 - Campaigns
 - Operations: doctrine to win campaigns
 - Tactics: how you win battles
 - (Millet, et al, 1986)

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- So, victory is something about achieving political goals.
- Which goals? What is the relation between military issues and political ones? How does this help us talk about what victory is?
- This is where Martel's ideas (2007) helped
 - Martel defines victory for states in military conflicts by looking at four related but conceptually independent dimensions

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- Martel (2007)
 - In all four dimensions, victory can be examined on a continuum from smaller to larger
 - Two dimensions discuss achievements (what the use of force got the state) and two dimensions discuss costs (what the state had to pay to get what the use of force resulted in)

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- Martel (2007)
 - “Level of Victory”
 - Military defeat of the opponent
 - Ranges from tactical victory to complete destruction of economic base so that the opponent cannot physically resist anymore.
 - “Change in Status Quo”
 - Political defeat of the opponent
 - Ranges from simple policy change to change in leadership/regime to wholesale cultural/institutional/economic restructuring

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- Martel (2007)
 - Both of these are the achievements of victory: how successfully did you defeat the opponents enemy, and how much political change did you achieve.
 - Examples:
 - Gulf War I: Lots of the former, little of the latter
 - Vietnam: Tons of the former, none of the latter
 - World War II: Lots of both

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- Martel (2007)
 - “Mobilization”
 - How much did it cost the state to “win?”
 - Not just money, but blood, political capital, resources, alliances, etc.
 - Ranges from minor to very, very expensive
 - “Post-Conflict Stabilization”
 - To what degree is the “winner” attached to the “loser” once the fighting ends?
 - Ranges from none (walk away) to nation-building

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- We don't argue that "greater costs prevent victory"
 - Clearly the US has paid enormous costs in both victory and defeat (WWII, Vietnam)
- Our argument is that when public expectations and military reality diverge, then states run into trouble
- States enter military conflicts expecting the cost of victory to be manageable (high or low)

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- In democracies, projected costs of military action are part of public discussion over whether use of force is appropriate.
 - Political leadership has rational incentive to downplay costs; lower costs, better chance of getting public acceptance to use force.
 - Any policy change (foreign, domestic, use of force, etc.) has to be “sold” to the public as an appropriate policy: achieves goals at reasonable cost. Part of the democratic process.

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- US public will allow use of force
 - Public accepts limited use of force
 - Eichenberg (2005) studies public opinion polling on all US conflicts from Afghanistan (1980) to Iraq (2003).
 - Shows public likes limited missions
 - We reinterpret Eichenberg's conclusions:
 - We argue that the majority of cases were “sold” as limited missions and had limited costs and goals
 - » It isn't that the public likes limited missions; the public likes it when costs and goals are reasonable.
 - Public accepts large costs and goals: Iraq and Afghanistan had highest public approval, and both had high costs and goals

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- However, once forces enter into combat, the costs of achieving those military and (especially) political goals can rise
 - Friction, enemy gets a say, poor planning, bad assumptions, etc.
- When they do rise, state has three choices:
 - Increase resources, to pay increased costs
 - Maintain costs; accept odds of victory are declining
 - Give up

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- As costs diverge from what the public accepted as costs, policy-makers come under pressure.
 - Politicians have many policies/goals
 - Military mission is only one among many
 - Rationally, may decide that increasing resources isn't worth political costs
 - Thus, more likely option is either withdrawal or asking military to do more with less (or the same) level of resources

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- The key is the divergence between expected costs (what the public believes) and actual costs
 - What accomplishing the “level of victory” and “change in status quo” (Martel) will actually cost
 - As the divergence increases, greater chance of policy-makers rationally giving up on the mission
 - (not asking for more resources to accomplish the increased goals)

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- We “test run” the theory by looking at two cases:
 - Lebanon, 1982/1983
 - Somalia, 1992
 - These are not full tests of the theory, but “plausibility probes” to see if our conception of the relationship between politics and military is plausible
 - If so, we’ll expand the project to a more substantial empirical test of more cases.