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THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

LISA BALL

“Regardless of which policy the Chinese government pursues, the [Christian] Church in China will profoundly affect the shape of Christianity worldwide for generations to come. With some thirty to seventy million souls and a growth rate of 7 percent annually, the number of Christians in China dwarfs the number of Christians in most nations of the earth. Like Christians throughout the developing world, Chinese Christians represent the vanguard of the Church in the twenty-first century.”¹

A number of contemporary historians, theologians, intellectuals, and journalists are heralding the “Christianization” of China in the twenty-first century. Some claim that if the present growth rate of Christianity in the cities and countryside continues for the next thirty years, Christianity will comprise nearly thirty percent of China’s population, making it the predominant worldview within the country’s political, cultural, and possibly even military establishments.¹ Others are asking, “Will the twenty-first century be China’s century in the world? If China does become a world leader, will Christian ideas influence her direction, her goals?”² Even though there is substantial evidence that China’s Communist government has remained hostile and repressive toward religion in general, in China, there is equally compelling proof that Christianity has formed deep roots in Chinese culture and become an active, unwieldy social force over which the Chinese Communist Party has been unable to gain control. Furthermore, sections of the American government, convinced of the existence and persecution of a growing Christian population in China, have taken a few dramatic steps in recent years to pressure the Chinese authorities into compliance with international human rights legislation. The internal social pressure of the accelerated growth of the Chinese Christian community within China combined with the external pressure of the American government and other free Western powers may, in the relatively near future, force the Chinese government to accept the free practice of Christianity in China. This would have serious political and economic implications for the futures of both China and the world.

During the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong in China, from 1966-1976, also known as “the Ten Lost Years,” China was closed off from the rest of the world and all religious institutions, of foreign and domestic origin, were banned or destroyed. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to power and opened China to the outside world. Under his leadership and the auspices of his “open door” policy, the previous motivation of the Chinese government attempts to eliminate religious groups evolved into a drive to subordinate religious and social elements to the state.

Although the state maintained strict control over religion, church buildings were allowed to reopen, and approved communities of believers were permitted to reorganize.³ Deng and his fellow Party officials, relying on previously existing concepts such as the United Front Policy and the Three Self Movement⁴ of the 1950’s formed the China Christian Council (CCC) with Bishop Ding Guangxun as president.

Three Self and the CCC, together referred to as *liang hui*, “two organizations,” often overlap and work together to tightly control Protestant Christianity in China. Because there is no separation of Church and state in Communist China, the *liang hui*, an atheist government organization under Bishop Ding, who is widely believed to be a Communist Party member, handles church organization, theological education, overseas delegations, seminary admissions, ordinations, and the assignment of pastors to different churches.⁵ In 1982, the Religious Affairs Bureau passed a “three designates” decree. This order stated that “pastors would not be permitted to preach outside an area specifically designated for their activity, or in a location that was not designated in a church, or to any community not assembled under Three Self auspices.”⁶

In the same year, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, the 1978 Party gathering that defined China’s new policy of engagement with the outside world, produced a key document called Document Number 19, which was an official statement of Communist Party doctrine on religion. It defined legal religious activity as that of registered believers taking place in a registered church building under registered religious leaders, and prohibited “Protestants [from] gathering in homes for worship services”⁷ and evangelism. The document is inherently contradictory, for the Party authors admit that they “are atheists and must unremittingly propagate atheism”⁸ and yet, are running a religious organization headed by the United Front Department, the Party organ in charge of the Religious Affairs Bureau. Document Number 19 demonstrated the problem facing the Chinese Communist Party at the turn of the twenty-first century: It was having difficulty reconciling its need to have

complete control over Chinese civic life, especially with respect to its growing religious population, and the need to “provide a freer climate in order to persuade the outside world that China’s open door policy did indeed offer a measure of personal freedom.”⁹

The overwhelming majority of Chinese Christians are not registered with the Three Self or the CCC; they have escaped Party control by becoming members of the rapidly expanding House Church networks. This does not mean, however that the House Church members have escaped persecution and oppression by the party. In the 1990’s, China’s Communist Party, wanting to be certain that the religious forces released into the culture by the “open door” policy would not undermine their control, cracked down on the increasing number of foreign Protestant Christian pastors and teachers who had come to the aid of the house churches. There were numerous raids and assaults on the unregistered House Church networks and repeated arrests, imprisonments, and beatings of members.¹⁰

The House Church members, despite these attacks, largely refused to concede to registration with the state church. They viewed the Three Self Church as the tool of an atheist state to control rather than aid religious freedom. Even the registered members of the Three Self were discontent with its sham Protestant Churches. One former Three Self pastor wrote to friends outside China:

The vast majority of the preachers and believers in the “open” churches have long ago lost all confidence in the Three Self, and are halfhearted. Many pretend to agree with it, but secretly oppose and resist it. Since 1979, many apostates and people who betrayed the Lord and their brethren have been appointed pastors. This has aroused strong dissatisfaction among a great number of good Christians and cries of discontent are heard everywhere.¹¹

The *liang hui* leadership has increasingly tried to force its modernist, authoritarian, ardently pro-communist agenda on the “open” churches under its authority and attacked the theologically conservative evangelicals who have challenged senior church officials.¹² Furthermore, the State Administration of Religious Affairs’ (SARA) director general, Ye Xiaowen, a Communist, and an ardent, militant atheist, is opposed to the expansion of Christianity, and yet holds one of the highest ranking positions overseeing matters of Christian theology. He has often attacked Christian groups as harmful to China’s modernization and world image. Yet in February 2003, Ye traveled to Los Angeles to address Protestant Christians to show America that SARA supported religious freedom

in China. He said, “I can tell you with pleasure, that Chinese Christians are running their church independently and have thus removed the ‘cap’ of foreignness.”¹³ Ye did not mention, however, that the Three Self church is the only Protestant Christian church permitted to function in the open, and that the Three Self is run almost completely by the state. Ye’s purpose in Los Angeles was to disprove reports that had been appearing all over America that China’s Christians had been abused and attacked by the Chinese government, to present a façade of religious freedom to the West to try to turn the spotlight of the world away from China’s real human and religious rights violations.

Although the registered Protestant Church remains under the control of the state and the unregistered House Church remains under persecution, Christianity is showing tremendous growth, with numbers reaching as high as eighty million.¹⁴ But, there are those who claim that the Protestant Christian movement is fragmented because of the great diversity of theological, practical and regional ideas and practices. Chinese Protestant Christianity is also said to be fragile because of the limited role the House Church plays or can play in

“Protestant Christians of the twentieth century reacted against the denominationalism of mission-founded churches and favored instead the formation of independent indigenous Protestant sects.”

Chinese culture and society.¹⁵ Historian Ryan Dunch presented a paper at a symposium entitled, “China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future: An International Conference of Reflections for the New Millennium” in which he claimed, “Having nearly five hundred years of schism in Western Protestantism to draw upon, plus disputes wholly Chinese in origin, the potential for bitter divisions is very great...”¹⁶ However, he mentions later in the same text, Protestant Christians of the twentieth century reacted against the denominationalism of mission-founded churches and favored instead the formation of independent indigenous Protestant sects. These groups shared many common traits: They all reacted against the hierarchical institutionalism of the mission-founded churches; remained theologically conservative and driven to purge the church of worldly entanglements and liberal, modernist theology; placed a strong

emphasis on direct spiritual experience; agreed on the absolute authority of the Bible and the autonomy of individual congregations; and eliminated requirements for institutional authorization beyond the congregation to validate leadership.¹⁷ Furthermore, he argues, these Protestant groups in China have had good reason to unite against two common “enemies”, the Communist Party’s Three Self Movement, and factional, liberal, denominationalist Western religious influences.

In August 1998, nearly a dozen representatives of the various Protestant House Church networks met together to draft the “United Appeal of the Various Branches of the Chinese Church.” These churches leveraged their strength and worked together to call on the Chinese government to “admit God’s power,” to stop persecuting Christians, release those who had been arrested, and to recognize the religious freedom of belief and practice of the unregistered house churches as a separate entity from the Three Self. They made reference to the strength of numbers they had as a united group:

There are approximately 10 million believers in the Three Self church but eighty million believers in the home churches in the House Church. The House Church represents the mainstream of Christianity in China. Therefore, the government should face reality as it is. If Taiwan with its population of 22 million cannot represent China but the mainland can with its population of 1.2 billion, so the Three Self Church cannot represent the Christian Church in China. The Three Self is only one branch. Moreover, in many spiritual matters there is serious deviation in the Three Self Church. The government should clearly understand this.¹⁸

The Chinese Christians not only sought to unite amongst themselves, they sought to connect themselves to a larger international Christian community. In the appeal mentioned above, the House Church leaders refer to the emergence of some Chinese equivalents of mainstream North American and European Protestant denominations such as Lutherans and Pentecostals. Furthermore, in November 1998, the House Church leaders produced a “Confession of Faith.” Seeking to define themselves in clear opposition to the theology of the Three Self, and seeking to separate themselves from cult doctrines that had arisen in China, the House Church emphatically pronounced that their various networks were theologically orthodox.¹⁹ The preamble to the confession clearly demonstrates their unification of purpose and their identification with the larger international orthodox Christian community:

In order to arrive at a common standard of faith among house churches in China, in order to establish a common basis for developing unity among fellow churches in China and overseas, in order to let the government and the Chinese public understand the positions of our faith, and in order to distinguish ourselves from heresies and cults...²⁰

The unregistered Protestant Christian groups do not appear to be fragmented or divided, but united and active, petitioning the government for their religious rights and positing the House Church movement as a theologically sound part of the international community of orthodox Christian faith, despite being labeled dangerous, evil cults

Dunch also suggested that Protestantism in China is fragile, lacking “a well-developed awareness of its own history”²¹ because of its large, diverse, and dispersed development and because of the many political disruptions and institutional limitations imposed on the church under the Chinese Communist government.²² Now, however, Chinese Christians are developing a history of Christianity in China. Deng’s “open door” policy increased the rate of exchange between China and foreign countries and has “enhanced research on the history of Chinese-foreign cultural communication.”²³

In the 1980’s and 1990’s, religious research institutes, departments, and organizations were established in many provincial and municipal social science academies and universities; for example, the Religion Research Institute at China’s Social Science Academy. These research institutes began producing publications such as *Shijie zongjiao wenhua*, “World Religion Culture.”²⁴ Protestants have produced *Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo*, “Missionaries and Modern China,” *Cong Malixin dao Situleideng: Laihua xinjiao chuanjiaoshi pingzhuan*, “From Morrison to Stuart: Critical Biographies of Protestant Missionaries in China,” and *Jidujiao yu jindai wenhua*, “Christianity and Modern Culture.”²⁵ Also, research on the history of Chinese Christian colleges, which began in the 1980’s, has progressed. Since these colleges had been previously regarded as “the tool of imperialist cultural invasion,”²⁶ there was no possibility for rigorous academic research on the subject of Christianity. The publication of and “Inquiry into Christian Higher Education in China” in 1986, called attention to the necessity for the Chinese to discuss the subject and indirectly brought about the First International Symposium on the History of Chinese Christian Universities, held at Central China Normal University in June 1989. Since then at least eight international symposia have been held on the

subject and six collections of symposium papers have been published.²⁷ In 1994, the Research Center for the History of Chinese Christian Colleges was founded at the Central China Normal University, and it has collaborated with other universities and foundations to publish more than ten issues of its “Newsletter for Historical Research on Chinese Christian Colleges,” a set of research collections, and a series of books on Christianity and Chinese culture.²⁸ Incomplete statistics show that over 1000 papers and nearly 100 monographs, translations, and compilations treating the subject of Chinese Christian history were published between 1989 and the present day. These works surpass, both in quantity and quality, the works of the preceding thirty years on the same topic.²⁹ These publications provide a much broader exchange space for present and future research into the history of Chinese Christianity.

Research on the present situation of Christianity in China has also begun. In 1996, Chen Cunfu published an article called “The Formations of ‘SMSC’ from a Historical Perspective Cultural Background,” which described the differences and similarities between “Scholars in Mainland China Studying Christianity” (SMSC) and “Cultural Christians,” Chinese intellectuals possessing Christian ideals and values, yet distanced from the existing church and its practice in China. According to Chen, SMSC “[are] the basis and soil for the growth and development of ‘Cultural Christians’ in China.”³⁰ The SMSC research the cultural value and significance of Christianity for humans and the historical and social function of Christianity in societal development. They are:

Chinese intellectuals outside the of the Chinese Church who are making serious studies of Christian Philosophy and theology, and standing for the affirmation and acceptance of Christian values and basic ideas, but without their personal conversion. They peruse an ideal state of Christian identity in the pluralistic concepts of value and life.³¹

These intellectuals have been successful in moving the subject of Christianity from the category of religion to that of culture, making it an acceptable course of study, avoiding the misunderstandings and sensibilities associated with religion in the contemporary Chinese context.

Many SMSC find the Christian value system in general and its cultural achievements highly praiseworthy. Yang Huilin, a professor at Renda and director of the Institute of Christian Culture at People’s University who classified himself as “not yet” a Christian, said that he thought Christianity was growing rapidly in China. He added:

China doesn’t need a new religion. It needs a new value system and a new way of thinking. Christianity has been developing in China rapidly for the past ten years...With globalization and post-modernity, we cannot find a clear value system and clear definitions and judgment. In this case, Christianity would find a very wide space. It is one of the strong points of Christianity to set up an absolute value system.³²

China’s intellectuals, Christian or not, are coming to see the Christian worldview and value system as a key social ingredient for a well-developed society. A scholar from one of China’s premier academic research institutes, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who specializes in the study of religion said to a group of American Christian ministers:

One of the things we were asked to look into was what accounted for the success, in fact, the pre-eminence of the West all over the world. We studied everything we could from the historical, political, economic, and cultural perspective. At first, we thought it was because you had the best political system. Next we focused on your economic system. But in the past twenty years, we have realized that the heart of your culture is your religion: Christianity. That is why the West has been so powerful. The Christian moral foundation of social and cultural life was what made possible the emergence of capitalism and then the successful transition to democratic politics. We don’t have any doubt about this.³³

Many Chinese scholars are pointing out that the throughout their history, the Chinese have lacked a transcendent religious character in which to firmly root society. Liu Xiaofeng, a scholar, writer, and translator wrote, “The historical rationalist core of Chinese culture has lacked the religious temperament of love and fear.” Many Christian and non-Christian writers, artists, musicians, and scholars are now trying to fill the spiritual void with Christian values.

Mao’s Cultural Revolution cured most Chinese of any belief in the validity of Communist theory. Thus, the collapse of the people’s belief in Marxist-Leninism left a massive ideological vacuum in Chinese society. This, combined with the spiritual void left after the widespread abandonment of Confucianism—most Chinese considered it a cumbersome philosophy, incapable of the social change, capitalistic creativity,

and spirit of entrepreneurship required for success in their new global world of economic competition³⁴—increasing economic growth, access to information, and added civic freedom created “an opportune atmosphere for the growth of Christianity in China both as a movement and as an ideology.” It has been reported that even the former Communist Party Leader, Jiang Zeming, said to trusted friends that if he could make one decree before leaving office that he knew would be obeyed in China, he “would make Christianity the official religion of China.”³⁵

But, Communism does not tolerate independence—it requires the complete dependence of all upon the state, and it does not tolerate divided allegiance. The allegiance of all must be, first and foremost, to the state. Christians, however, give their allegiance first to God, and no matter how much persecution and oppression has been applied to the Chinese Christians to break them of their allegiance to God, it has not yet happened. The growth of Protestantism in China represents a massive call for autonomy from the state, a call that could have political implications in undermining the claims of ultimate ideological allegiance of the Communist Party and in forcing recognition of a *de facto* pluralism in China.³⁶

The American government may have a role to play in urging the Chinese Communist Party to accept this *de facto* pluralism or allow true religious freedom. Aware of the many human rights violations in the area of religious freedom the Chinese government has been committing, Congress, under the Clinton Administration, enacted the “International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.” The purpose of this act was to integrate religious liberty into the overall foreign policy of the United States.

Congress and the Bush Administration have continued this integration and have increased the attention paid to human rights issues in China. In February 2004, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) puts out its yearly report on the status of human rights violations worldwide, in which China was labeled a “country of particular concern” (CPC) citing the Chinese government’s ongoing crackdown on religious and spiritual groups. China has been labeled a CPC every year since the United States began using the designation in 1999.³⁷ The USCIRF reported that “severe restrictions on religious and political liberties are authorized at the highest levels of the Communist Party” and that “China’s conditions of human rights, including religious freedom, have deteriorated...”³⁸ The U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom stated before the Human Rights Caucus that the “Current Status Religious Freedom—meaning the internationally acknowledged right of every human being to believe

and practice as he sees fit—does not exist in China.” He further stated that the “‘rule’ remains one of official hostility to religion—the conviction that religion cannot be permitted to grow unchecked, that it must be adapted to socialism, and that it must be free of foreign influence which might destabilize the communist regime.”³⁹

Both USCIRF and the U.S. Ambassador at Large called for the United States to introduce a resolution on China at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, in March 2004, because the Chinese government had continued to commit severe human rights violations, largely in the area of religious freedom. Congressmen Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Tom Lantos (D-CA) introduced, and Congress overwhelmingly passed, House Resolution 530, which urged the U.S. government to take the lead in “introducing and organizing multilateral support for a resolution at the sixtieth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights calling on China to end its human rights violations and meet internationally recognized standards for human rights.”⁴⁰ USCIRF chairman, Michael Young, pointed out that while U.S.–Chinese relations are advancing on economic and trade issues, the “dialogue on human rights is stagnant” and China has yet “to demonstrate a willingness to abide by international human rights norms.”⁴¹ Despite overwhelming bipartisan U.S. support for resolution 530, and the release of the Freedom House⁴² annual report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which listed China among the “worst of the worst,”⁴³ the UN voted to reject the U.S. draft resolution against China before it was even put to a vote.⁴⁴

However, if the U.S. continues to shine a spotlight on China and report to the world its violations, other nations may begin to pressure China to conform to international human rights standards. And, if Chinese Christianity continues to grow, unite, and assert itself in the culture, it may soon become a force too large either to repress or to ignore. Protestant Christianity has established a place in the People’s Republic of China and as a “transnational reality”⁴⁵ in the early stages of the twenty-first century and this undeniable Protestant Christian element of today’s Chinese culture may just contribute to a more free China and a new Chinese-Christian worldview tomorrow.⁴⁶

Endnotes

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